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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge: 
 
We are principally called upon in this appeal to decide 
two issues of first impression in this Court. The first is one 
in a long line of post-Lopez1 challenges to federal statutes 
on Commerce Clause grounds, this one to the federal bank 
robbery statute, 18 U.S.C. S 2113. The second asks that we 
determine whether a recent amendment to the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines which, in the words of the 
Sentencing Commission, "defines and describes aberrant 
behavior" was a mere clarification or a substantive change 
in the law. We reject the challenge to S 2113 and conclude 
that the amendment at issue effected a substantive change 
and, thus, cannot be applied retroactively. Accordingly, we 
will affirm. 
 
What has brought us to this point is uncomplicated and 
not in dispute. Shortly before 3:00 p.m. on January 13, 
1999, appellant Robert Spinello, an officer with the Edison, 
New Jersey, Police Department, walked into the First 
Savings Bank in Edison. He approached a bank teller, 
flashed the service pistol that he had concealed in a 
newspaper, placed a plastic bag on the counter, and 
demanded of the teller, "[G]ive me all your fifty and [one] 
hundred straps." In response to the teller's statement that 
she had only one strap each of fifty and one-hundred dollar 
bills, Spinello told the teller to "keep on going," and then 
waited as she filled the plastic bag with $3,500 in the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 
                                2 
  
following denominations: $1,000 in one hundred dollar 
bills, $1,000 in fifty dollar bills, $1,000 in twenty dollar 
bills, and $500 in ten dollar bills. After the bag was filled, 
Spinello "told [the teller] to count to ten, and then started 
to walk away." After exiting the bank, Spinello drove to his 
brother's condominium and stashed the $3,500 in a living 
room table. Spinello put the money straps and the hat he 
wore during the robbery into a garbage can, hung his jacket 
in a closet, and proceeded to the Edison Police 
Headquarters, where he arrived at approximately 3:30 p.m. 
for his 3:50 p.m. tour of duty. 
 
Later that same day, Spinello, who had been followed out 
of the bank by a bank customer who memorized his license 
plate number, was told by his superiors to go to the bank 
for questioning by the FBI. After his interview with the FBI, 
Spinello submitted to a "show-up" identification procedure 
where he was positively identified by the victim teller. A 
subsequent search of the Edison condominium revealed 
$3,500 in the same denominations as had been stolen from 
the bank. Spinello was arrested. 
 
On September 16, 1999, Spinello was charged by a 
federal grand jury in a three-count indictment with: (1) 
bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 2113(a) and 2; (2) 
bank robbery with a dangerous weapon, in violation of 
SS 2113(d) and 2; and (3) use of a firearm in relation to a 
crime of violence, in violation of SS 924(c) and 2. Prior to 
trial, Spinello moved to dismiss the indictment, alleging 
that the bank robbery statute itself, or the application of 
the bank robbery to the facts of his case, exceeded 
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. The District 
Court denied Spinello's motion. See United States v. 
Spinello, 95 F. Supp. 2d 242 (D.N.J. 2000). As a result, 
Spinello went to trial. 
 
On May 17, 2000, the jury convicted Spinello on all three 
counts of the indictment. Prior to his sentencing, Spinello 
admitted that he had, in fact, robbed the First Savings 
Bank and submitted a memorandum that set forth certain 
facts pertinent to sentencing -- in particular, facts by 
which he hoped to rebut an obstruction of justice 
enhancement and support, on various grounds, his motion 
for a downward departure. Two of those grounds are 
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reraised on appeal -- the aberrational nature of his 
behavior and the "extraordinary" anguish and remorse he 
was suffering because of the prosecution of his brother, 
Michael, for perjury allegedly committed by him in his 
defense of Spinello. The District Court denied the motion 
for a downward departure and sentenced Spinello to an 
aggregate term of 111 months in prison. 
 
Spinello filed a timely notice of appeal. We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 
S 3742. 
 
I. 
 
The Commerce Clause and 18 U.S.C. S 2113  
 
We turn, first, to Spinello's argument that in enacting 18 
U.S.C. S 2113 -- the federal statute criminalizing bank 
robbery -- Congress exceeded its power under the 
Commerce Clause,2 an argument which one of our sister 
circuits has somewhat pithily described as "popular with 
criminal defendants these days." United States v. Watts, 
256 F.3d 630, 631 (7th Cir. 2001). Relying on United States 
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), Spinello claims that, as an 
intrastate activity, bank robbery -- or, at least, his bank 
robbery -- does not have a "substantial effect" upon 
interstate commerce and, thus, S 2113 must fall. "Our 
review of the statute's constitutionality is plenary, though 
we must respect Congress's ample discretion to determine 
the appropriate exercise of its Commerce Clause authority." 
United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 469 (3d Cir. 1999), 
cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 2008 (2000). Indeed, there is a 
"presumption of constitutionality." United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000). The precise question 
we must answer is this: Did Congress have a rational basis 
for concluding that bank robbery substantially affects 
interstate commerce? The answer is a ringing "Yes." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Constitution of the United States provides: "The Congress shall 
have power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among 
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. Const., Art. I, S 8, 
cl. 3. 
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In Lopez, the Supreme Court struck down the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. S 922(q), because the 
Act "neither regulate[d] a commercial activity nor 
contain[ed] a requirement that possession be connected in 
any way to interstate commerce." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. 
Lopez was significant not so much because, in terms of its 
analysis of the commerce power, it plowed new ground. 
Rather, it was significant -- and jumped on by defendants 
-- because it was the first case in more than half a century 
in which the Supreme Court invalidated an act of Congress 
solely because Congress had exceeded its authority under 
the Commerce Clause; indeed, S 922(q) bore virtually no 
relation to interstate commerce. Although, since Lopez, we 
have upheld numerous federal criminal statutes against 
challenges that they were impermissible exercise of 
Congress's commerce power,3 this is our first occasion to 
consider that challenge when addressed to S 2113. 
 
It is by now familiar teaching, by virtue of Lopez and its 
progeny and lower court decisions too numerous to count 
much less mention, that Congress may regulate under its 
commerce power in three broad categories. First,"Congress 
may regulate the use of the channels of interstate 
commerce." Second, "Congress is empowered to regulate 
and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or 
persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the 
threat may come only from intrastate activities." And, third, 
"Congress' commerce authority includes the power to 
regulate those activities having a substantial relation to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. See, e.g., United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. 
denied, 121 S.Ct. 1600 (2001) (upholding Freedom of Access to Clinic 
Entrances Act); United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. 
denied, 529 U.S. 1131 (2000) (upholding federal statute prohibiting 
intrastate possession of child pornography); United States v. Parker, 108 
F.3d 28 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837 (1997)(upholding Child 
Support Recovery Act, which criminalizes failure to pay past due support 
obligations); United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. 
denied, 522 U.S. 807 (1997)(upholding federal statute criminalizing 
possession of a machine gun); United States v. Orozco, 98 F.3d 105 (3d 
Cir. 1996)(upholding Drug-Free School Zones Act); United States v. 
Gateward, 84 F.3d 670 (3d Cir. 1996) (upholding federal statute barring 
felons from possessing firearms); United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569 
(3d Cir. 1995) (upholding federal carjacking statute). 
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interstate commerce" -- activities that "substantially affect 
interstate commerce." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59. Because 
the Gun-Free School Zones Act at issue in Lopez  did not 
involve any channels or instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce, it could only have survived, if it were to have 
survived, under the "substantially affects" category, and 
that was the category on which the Court focused. 
 
With reference to the third category, under Lopez a 
federal criminal statute that includes a jurisdictional 
element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, 
that the prohibited conduct substantially affects interstate 
commerce would, without more, pass muster as would a 
statute reaching intrastate economic activity that 
substantially affects interstate commerce. See id. at 559-61. 
It is, thus, appropriate to consider, first, whether there is in 
S 2113 a jurisdictional element which "adequately performs 
the function of guaranteeing that the final product 
regulated substantially affects interstate commerce." Rodia, 
194 F.3d at 473. If it does, as it did not in Rodia, there 
would be no necessity to perform the inherently imprecise 
analysis of S 2113's constitutionality under the remaining 
Lopez considerations -- and more about those 
considerations later -- to determine if intrastate bank 
robbery substantially affects interstate commerce. 
 
A jurisdictional element, as that phrase has been used in 
and after Lopez, "refers to a provision in a federal statute 
that requires the government to establish specific facts 
justifying the exercise of federal jurisdiction in connection 
with any individual application of the statute." Rodia, 194 
F.3d at 471.4 Spinello correctly notes that "[t]he mere 
presence of a jurisdictional element . . . does not in and of 
itself insulate a statute from judicial scrutiny under the 
Commerce Clause, or render it per se constitutional. To the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. A jurisdictional element is not, however, required, at least where the 
federal statute under review regulates economic activity -- and, as we 
will discuss, S 2113 does just that. "The law, made clear in Lopez, is 
that 
where Congress is not regulating economic activity, or instrumentalities 
in interstate commerce, the concept of federalism requires a 
jurisdictional element linking the criminal act to interstate commerce." 
United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 694, n.7 (7th Cir. 1995) (Coffee, 
J., 
dissenting). 
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contrary, courts must inquire further to determine whether 
the jurisdictional element has the requisite nexus with 
interstate commerce," i.e. whether that element "limits the 
statute to items that have an explicit connection with, or 
effect upon, interstate commerce." United States v. Bishop, 
66 F.3d 569, 585 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
It requires no great mental gymnastics to conclude that 
a more than adequate jurisdictional element is present in 
S 2113. Section 2113, unlike S 922(q), contains an express 
jurisdictional element with the requisite limitation because 
a covered bank is defined, in pertinent part, as a member 
of the Federal Reserve System or a banking institution 
organized under the laws of the United States or an 
institution whose deposits are insured by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation. See 18 U.S.C.S 2113(f). The 
Ninth Circuit, in the course of rejecting the same lack of 
nexus argument raised here, concluded that it was 
sufficient that S 2113 "contains jurisdictional language that 
requires the prosecutor to establish a connection to 
interstate commerce because the statute's coverage is 
limited to banks that are members of the Federal Reserve 
System or insured by the FDIC." United States v. Harris, 
108 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 1997). See also United States 
v. Fryer, 896 F. Supp. 763, 764-65 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 
 
The "case-by-case inquiry" Lopez requires leaves no 
doubt not only that the jurisdictional element inS 2113 
ensures that bank robbery substantially affects interstate 
commerce but that, as the jury found, the First Savings 
Bank was within the statute's coverage because it was 
insured by the FDIC. But even if the jurisdictional element 
in S 2113 had been found wanting, the statute would, 
nonetheless, survive a Commerce Clause challenge because 
intrastate bank robbery "substantially affects" interstate 
commerce. 
 
The Lopez Court, in setting forth the analytical 
framework for determining whether a regulated activity 
substantially affects interstate commerce, specified four 
considerations: (1) whether the statute is one "that by its 
terms has nothing to do with `commerce' or any sort of 
economic enterprise, however broadly one might define 
those terms," Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; (2) whether, as we 
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have already discussed, the statute is one that contains an 
"express jurisdictional element which might limit its reach 
to a discrete set of [intrastate activities] that additionally 
have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate 
commerce," id. at 562; (3) whether the statute or "its 
legislative history contain[s] express congressional findings 
regarding the effects upon interstate commerce" of the 
regulated intrastate activity, id.; and (4) whether the link 
between the regulated intrastate activity and the effect on 
interstate commerce is too attenuated, id. at 563-67. The 
Court concluded: "These are not precise formulations, and 
in the nature of things they cannot be. But we think they 
point the way to a correct decision in this case. The 
possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an 
economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, 
substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce." Id. at 
567. 
 
Clearly, for starters, the robbery of a bank, unlike the 
intrastate possession of a gun within a school zone which 
Congress attempted to regulate in S 922(q), is an 
"economic" activity almost by definition and is certainly an 
economic activity within the broad definition that we 
adopted in Bishop. In Bishop, we upheld the federal 
carjacking statute and explained that carjacking was an 
"economic" activity: "When a criminal points a gun at a 
victim and takes his or her car, the criminal has made an 
economic gain and the victim has suffered an undeniable 
and substantial loss. Replicated 15,000 or 20,000 times per 
year, the economic effects are indeed profound." Bishop, 66 
F.3d at 581; see also United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 
262 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding that the misconduct regulated 
by the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE), 
which barred abortion protestors from blocking entrances 
to reproductive health care facilities, had "an effect which 
is, at its essence, economic" since it interfered with the 
commercial transaction of a potential abortion). A bank 
robber is obviously motivated by his or her own immediate 
economic gain -- money is, of course, "economic" -- and, 
wholly aside from whether FDIC insurance will ultimately 
kick in, the victim bank and its depositors suffer immediate 
economic losses as well as the disruption to their respective 
abilities to engage in commerce, interstate or otherwise, by 
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such activities as lending and purchasing assets. Thus, it 
cannot be said that S 2113 "has nothing to do with 
`commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however, 
broadly one might define those terms." Lopez , 514 U.S. at 
561. 
 
With regard to whether the link between the regulated 
intrastate activity -- here, bank robbery -- and the effect on 
interstate commerce is too attenuated -- a question we 
have already answered in the negative in the course of our 
discussion of the jurisdictional element which, we found, 
guaranteed that nexus -- we stress that S 2113 is not 
plagued by the exaggerated "but-for" causation that 
brought a death knell, first, to the statute in Lopez, where 
the Court rejected the speculative effects of school-zone 
possession of guns on interstate commerce and, then, to 
the statute in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 
(2000), where the Court struck down the civil remedy 
provision of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) after 
rejecting the similarly-speculative effects of gender- 
motivated violence on interstate commerce. Unlike the 
activities regulated in S 922(q) and the VAWA, and separate 
and apart from the existence or lack thereof of a 
jurisdictional element, bank robbery has immediate, non- 
collateral, non-speculative effects on interstate commerce. 
As the government puts it: 
 
        Robberies of banks insured by the FDIC, in the 
       aggregate, clearly have a substantial affect on 
       interstate commerce. The deposits of the banks are 
       often the assets of companies, other entities, and 
       individuals, who are engaged in interstate commerce, 
       and who depend on these assets to conduct their 
       interstate business. Individual banks themselves are 
       involved in interstate commerce in their deposits and 
       other financial services, and are integral, indispensable 
       parts of a large complicated financial web that is 
       employed every day to move money across the nation 
       and around the globe. Additionally, banks lend their 
       deposits and other funds to companies, other entities, 
       and individuals so that they may participate in 
       interstate financial and business transactions. The 
       banks' assets are constantly moving in and out of 
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       interstate commerce. In fact, interstate commerce 
       would be crippled without the funds of banks insured 
       by the FDIC. Robberies of these banks threaten the 
       uninterrupted operation of these financial institutions 
       and the confidence the public has in them. 
 
Appellee's Br. at 33-34. Indeed, long ago, Mr. Justice 
Holmes observed, in a case involving a fraud on a state 
bank which was a member of the Federal Reserve System, 
"[E]very fraud like the one before us weakens the member 
bank and therefore weakens the System." Westfall v. United 
States, 274 U.S. 256, 259 (1927). Almost as long ago, 
Congress itself recognized the connection between 
interstate commerce and the federally-insured status of 
banks when it concluded that interstate commerce would 
be facilitated by a system of federal insurance for the 
deposits of banks that preserves the "sound, effective, and 
uninterrupted operation of the banking system." See 
Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614, 49 Stat. 684 (1935). Thus, 
unlike the farfetched "effects" suggested in Lopez and 
Morrison, there is no need to "pile inference upon inference" 
to manufacture an effect of this intrastate criminal activity 
upon interstate commerce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. 
 
Finally, as the District Court recognized with reference to 
the remaining Lopez consideration, "where the connection 
to interstate commerce is plainly apparent," as it is here, 
"the absence of detailed, numeric [congressional] findings 
[regarding the effects of bank robbery on interstate 
commerce] is not dispositive." Spinello , 95 F. Supp. 2d at 
247. The legislative history is far from silent, however, and 
it is quite clear from that history that when S 2113 was 
originally enacted in 1934, it was in response to the 
problem of " `gangsters who operate habitually from one 
State to another in robbing banks.' " Bell v. United States, 
462 U.S. 356, 361 (1983), quoting S.Rep. No. 537, 73d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934), itself quoting a Justice 
Department memorandum. The House Report quoted the 
same memorandum: "From all sections of this country 
Federal relief has been requested. It is asserted that these 
criminals are sufficiently powerful and well equipped to defy 
local police, and to flee beyond the borders of the State 
before adequate focus can be organized to resist and 
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capture these bandits." H.R. Rep. No. 1461, 73d Cong., 2d 
Sess., 2 (1934). As we observed in Bishop,"[I]f a criminal 
activity is rationally believed to be one of the conduits of a 
nationwide and international pipeline of illegal activity, 
Congress may justifiably step in and regulate that activity 
although it is wholly intrastate." 66 F.3d at 585. 
 
It is important to note that the decisions in Lopez and 
Morrison were largely driven by the principle that there 
must remain "a distinction between what is truly national 
and what is truly local." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68. In this 
regard, we find it eminently appropriate that, in rejecting 
Spinello's challenge, the District Court noted that"federal 
law has prohibited bank robberies for 65 years. Thus, 
S 2113 neither invades an area of long-standing exclusive 
state regulation nor upsets the traditional balance between 
the states and the federal government." Spinello, 95 F. 
Supp. 2d at 248 n.9; see also Rodia, 194 F.3d at 479 
(pointing to the over twenty-year history of federal 
regulation of child pornography). 
 
Those courts of appeals that have thus far addressed in 
reported opinions Lopez challenges to S 2113 have given 
those challenges much shorter shrift than we have given 
them, and have uniformly rejected them.5  The Seventh 
Circuit, in the most recent rejection, did not reach the issue 
of whether the robbery of an intrastate bank substantially 
affects interstate commerce because it found that"at the 
very least, the FDIC-insured financial institutions are 
instrumentalities and channels of interstate commerce and 
their protection from robbery is well within Congress's 
Commerce Clause power." Watts, 256 F.3d at 634. See also 
Harris, 108 F.3d at 1109 (banks that are members of the 
Federal Reserve System or insured by the FDIC are 
instrumentalities and channels of interstate commerce and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We note that, in unreported opinions, the Fourth and Eighth Circuits 
have also rejected Lopez challenges to S 2113, and have similarly given 
those challenges short shrift. See United States v. Kluver, No. 99-1848, 
2000 WL 1705073 (8th Cir. Nov. 15, 2000)(the requirement that the 
victim bank be federally insured provided the necessary connection to 
interstate commerce); United States v. Walker , No. 95-5223, 1996 WL 
414302 at *2 (4th Cir. July 25, 1996)(S 2113 is a valid exercise of 
Congress's Commerce Clause power). 
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their regulation is well within Congress's Commerce Clause 
power). The only other courts which have, to date, 
considered the issue in reported opinions have been even 
more succinct. See Fryer, 896 F. Supp. at 764-65 (it is 
"crystal clear" by the definitions of the included federal 
institutions that the crime of bank robbery underS 2113(a) 
and (d) is "unquestionably well within the United States' 
commerce power"). An earlier Seventh Circuit case 
described the argument that S 2113 exceeds Congress's 
powers under the Commerce Clause in one word, with no 
further discussion required: "untenable." United States v. 
Wicks, 132 F.3d 383, 390 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 
Given our disposition that the activity of bank robbery 
substantially affects interstate commerce, we need not 
consider, much less decide, whether banks, as defined in 
S 2113(f), are channels and/or instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce, although such a conclusion would 
seem logical given that banks are the sources and the 
repositories of the very fuel of our complex interstate 
(indeed, global) economy. Banks, although static and 
incapable of themselves moving in interstate commerce, are 
integral to the web of interstate commercial activity that 
permeates our economy today and, as described by the 
government, are "the conduit for the primary factor in 
commerce -- money -- and the channel through which vast 
amounts of interstate commerce are conducted." See 
Spinello, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 249.6 Moreover, as the Watts 
Court explained: 
 
       FDIC-insured banks are fundamental to the conduct of 
       interstate commerce. Congress created the FDIC to 
       "keep open the channels of trade and commercial 
       exchange." Weir v. United States, 92 F.2d 634, 636 (7th 
       Cir. 1937) . . . [T]he government insurance is federally 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The District Court found the government's argument that S 2113 is a 
legitimate regulation of a channel or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce to be "compelling" and "strongly supported by the role banks 
play in facilitating, and indeed, permitting the flow of interstate 
commerce . . . ." Spinello, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 249, n.11. Because, 
however, it had decided the issue under the "substantially affects" 
category of commerce power, it, as we, did not need to decide the issue 
under the channels or instrumentalities categories. 
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       administered, federal officials periodically examine the 
       accounts, and the reports sent to the FDIC deal with 
       money that has been deposited from many sources, 
       including those outside the state." United States v. 
       Peay, 972 F.2d 71, 75 (4th Cir. 1992). Robberies of 
       FDIC-insured banks thus have an interstate economic 
       effect . . . Accordingly, at the very least, the FDIC- 
       insured financial institutions are instrumentalities and 
       channels of interstate commerce . . . . 
 
Watts, 256 F.3d at 633-34. 
 
We find that 18 U.S.C. S 2113 avoids the infirmities that 
doomed the statutes at issue in Lopez and Morrison. Bank 
robbery is an economic activity that, with or without 
repetition elsewhere, substantially affects interstate 
commerce and, thus, is an activity that Congress was well 
within its rights to criminalize pursuant to its power under 
the Commerce Clause. There was simply no federal overkill 
here, and we reject Spinello's challenge to the 
constitutionality of S 2113.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Spinello suggests something akin to an "as applied" challenge as well. 
He argues that because bank robbery is a noncommercial activity (a 
proposition it should by now be quite clear we reject), the government 
was required -- but failed -- to prove that his offense -- $3,500 from a 
local branch bank -- had a "substantial effect' upon interstate 
commerce. Citing United States v. McGuire, 178 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 1999), 
he claims that each non-commercial intrastate offense predicated upon 
Commerce Clause powers must be shown to have its own"substantial 
effect" upon interstate commerce in order to be a constitutional exercise 
of federal criminal jurisdiction. See McGuire , 178 F.3d at 211-12 
(reversing the defendant's conviction for blowing up his mother's car 
where the only evidence in support of a jurisdictional link was an orange 
juice container that was fortuitously in the car at the time of the 
explosion and happened to have moved in interstate commerce). McGuire 
stands for the unremarkable proposition that the evidence of a 
connection to interstate commerce may be too trivial or attenuated to 
support a conviction. Moreover, the McGuire Court was explicit that it 
was not saying that the government is required to establish that each 
particular use must have a substantial effect on interstate commerce but 
only that the evidence presented in that case was not sufficient to 
support a conviction. McGuire, 178 F.3d at 212, n.10. And, of course, 
Lopez itself was quite clear that where the regulatory statute bears a 
substantial relation to commerce, as clearly S 2113 does, the de minimus 
character of particular instances is of no consequence. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
at 558. 
 
                                13 
  
II. 
 
       5K2.20 -- The Aberrant Behavior Guideline 
 
Spinello argues, next, that the District Court's reliance on 
the legal standard enunciated in United States v. Marcello, 
13 F.3d 752, 761 (3d Cir. 1994), in its denial of his motion 
for a downward departure based on "aberrant behavior," 
was erroneous. Under Marcello, aberrant behavior "must 
involve a lack of planning; it must be a single act that is 
spontaneous and thoughtless, and no consideration is given 
to whether the defendant is a first time offender." Marcello, 
13 F.3d at 761. At sentencing, Spinello recognized that 
Marcello was circuit precedent which the District Court was 
obliged to apply. However, effective November 1, 2000, 
subsequent to his sentencing, the Sentencing Commission 
amended the Guidelines via Amendment 603 to add 
S 5K2.20, which defines "aberrant behavior" in a manner 
different from Marcello, to wit: " `Aberrant behavior' means 
a single criminal occurrence or single criminal transaction 
that (A) was committed without significant planning; (B) 
was of limited duration; and (C) represents a marked 
deviation by the defendant from an otherwise law-abiding 
life." U.S.S.G. S 5K2.20, Comment., n.1. 8 Spinello seeks a 
remand to give the District Court the opportunity to 
consider S 5K2.20 and, hopefully, to resentence him to a 
lower term. Because Spinello contends that the addition of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. S 5K2.20 itself provides, under the heading "Aberrant Behavior (Policy 
Statement)": 
 
       A sentence below the applicable guideline range may be warranted 
       in an extraordinary case if the defendant's criminal conduct 
       constituted aberrant behavior. However, the court may not depart 
       below the guideline range on this basis if (1) the offense involved 
       serious bodily injury or death; (2) the defendant discharged a 
       firearm or otherwise used a firearm or a dangerous weapon; (3) the 
       instant offense of conviction is a serious drug trafficking 
offense; (4) 
       the defendant has more than one criminal history point, as 
       determined under Chapter Four (Criminal History and Criminal 
       Livelihood); or (5) the defendant has a prior federal, or state, 
felony 
       conviction, regardless of whether the conviction is countable under 
       Chapter Four. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 5K2.20. 
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S 5K2.20 demonstrates that the District Court committed 
legal error in applying Marcello, we have jurisdiction to 
consider this claim. Our review is plenary. See United 
States v. Paster, 173 F.3d 206, 212 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
The remand that Spinello seeks as a result of the conflict 
between Marcello and S 5K2.20 is only possible if that 
guideline section can be applied retroactively. Because 
S 5K2.20 is not listed in S 1B1.10(c) for automatic 
retroactive application, the question before us is whether 
S 5K2.20 is a mere "clarification" of the law that merits 
retroactive application to a defendant on direct appeal or a 
"substantive change" to the Guidelines that does not. See 
United States v. Marmolejos, 140 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 
1998); see also U.S.S.G. S 1B1.11(b)(2) ("[T]he court shall 
consider subsequent amendments, to the extent that such 
amendments are clarifying rather than substantive 
changes."). In Marmolejos, we recognized"the established 
principle that a post-sentencing amendment to a 
sentencing guideline or its comments should be given effect 
if it `clarifies' the guideline or comment in place at the time 
of sentencing," while also noting that if an"amendment 
effects a substantive change in the law, the defendant does 
not reap the benefit of the new provision." Id. at 491 
(emphasis added). 
 
We find that Amendment 603, which added S 5K2.20, 
worked a substantive change to the Guidelines rather than 
a mere clarification of the Guidelines. In Marmolejos, we 
acknowledged that there was no bright-line test for 
ascertaining whether an amendment was a clarification or 
a substantive change. We stressed, however, that our point 
of reference was "the guideline or comment in place at the 
time of sentencing," Id. at 490, and that the important 
factors to consider with respect to that point of reference 
were (1) whether, as a matter of construction, that point of 
reference was consistent with the amended manual, (2) the 
purpose and effect of the enabling amendment, and (3) the 
language of the amendment itself. See id. at 491 (citations 
omitted). We shall address each of these factors in turn 
with respect to S 5K2.20 and Amendment 603-- the 
amendment that put into place that section of the 
Guidelines. 
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First, we concern ourselves with matters of general 
construction. Prior to the addition of S 5K2.20, the only 
identifiable primary source for the secondary case law that 
had developed the notion of aberrant behavior departures 
was Chapter One, Part A, Subpart 4(d) of the Guidelines. 
Significantly, it was there expressly stated that"[t]he 
Commission, of course, has not dealt with the single acts of 
aberrant behavior that still may justify probation at higher 
offense levels through departures." U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A, 
4(d) (emphasis added). The Commission's express 
acknowledgment that it had not, prior to Amendment 603, 
decided what to do about aberrant behavior departures 
suggests that, as a matter of construction, any subsequent 
guideline that issued on that subject would not merely be 
providing some additional guidance or clarification from the 
Commission regarding a concept that it had unsuccessfully 
attempted to explain in the past. Rather, that 
acknowledgment demonstrates that any subsequent 
guideline that issued on that subject would constitute the 
Commission's first impression and announcement of the 
necessary grounds for such a departure and, thus, effect a 
substantive change as opposed to a clarification. Stated 
somewhat differently, it cannot be seriously maintained 
that an amendment that creates an entirely new guideline 
is a mere clarifying amendment; the Commission cannot 
clarify a position where there was no prior position. 
 
Next, with respect to the stated purpose and effect of 
Amendment 603, we note that this amendment added 
S 5K2.20 to the Guidelines to "respond[ ] to a circuit conflict 
regarding whether, for purposes of downward departure 
from the guideline range, a `single act of aberrant behavior' 
(Chapter One, Part A, Subpart 4(d)) includes multiple acts 
occurring over a period of time." See U.S.S.G. App. C, 
amend. 603 (Reason for Amendment). Significantly, 
Amendment 603 does not indicate that its purpose is to 
clarify its position or the Guidelines approach to aberrant 
behavior departures. While we noted in United States v. 
Diaz, 245 F.3d 294, 304 (3d Cir. 2001), that the presence 
or absence of the words "clarify" or "clarifying" does not 
alone determine the retroactivity of an amendment, we also 
noted that "it is our own interpretation of the pre- 
amendment guidelines that determines whether the 
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Amendment clarified that interpretation or substantively 
changed it." Id. at 304 (emphasis added). In this regard, 
because there was no pre-amendment guideline that even 
tangentially addressed an aberrant behavior departure in a 
manner that resembles that which S 5K2.20 now 
incorporates, we consider it to be of some significance that 
the Commission did not indicate that the Amendment was 
designed to clarify some previously-held position. 9 Indeed, 
the absence of any such indication supports our conclusion 
that Amendment 603 and S 5K2.20 set forth the 
Commission's first statement of what would -- or could -- 
constitute the grounds for an aberrant behavior departure. 
Parenthetically, we also find significant one of the professed 
effects of Amendment 603 -- the incorporation of specific 
characteristics for offense conduct that makes one eligible 
for an aberrant behavior departure. See U.S.S.G. App. C, 
amend. 603 (Reason for Amendment). The fact that the 
Commission acknowledges that it "chose" these specific 
characteristics from case law and public comment again 
confirms to us that the Commission was formulating a new 
position as opposed to clarifying an existing one. See id. 
 
Finally, the language of the Amendment itself and, most 
particularly, two phrases therein, also prompts the 
conclusion that what was afoot was a substantive change 
to the Guidelines. First, we note that the Amendment, by 
its very terms, "defines and describes `aberrant behavior' " 
and "creates a new policy statement and accompanying 
commentary." See id. Obviously, because these words are 
suggestive of more activity on the part of the Commission 
than the words "explains", "clarifies," or "simplifies" would 
connote and because there was no prior guideline on 
aberrant behavior, we find that they suggest a substantive 
change in the law. Our conclusion is reinforced by the fact 
that Amendment 603 was, admittedly, a "compromise 
amendment." See id. Again, the Commission's intention to 
"compromise" between two very different circuit views when 
giving meaning to the phrase "aberrant behavior" evidences 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We find it interesting that in seven other amendments to the 
Guidelines that also became effective on November 1, 2000, the 
Commission specifically used the word "clarify." See, e.g., U.S.S.G. App. 
C, amends. 577, 579, 581, 591, 598, 599, and 600. 
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the fact that it merely responded to external sources and 
created a new guideline as opposed to reflecting internally 
upon what aberrant behavior was always intended to mean. 
The Tenth Circuit -- the only other circuit court to date to 
consider the issue -- recently came to the same conclusion: 
 
       It is clear to us that the Commission viewed S 5K2.20 
       as a "substantive" change. Section 5K2.20 adds an 
       entirely new section to the Guidelines--new text and 
       new commentary. It "alter[ed] the controlling pre- 
       amendment interpretation" of "aberrant behavior" in all 
       the federal Courts of Appeals, since it rejected in part 
       both the majority and minority rules on the issue. 
       Consequently, we conclude that S 5K2.20 is 
       "substantive" and, as such, off-limits for purposes of 
       our review of Alvarez's case. 
 
United States v. Alvarez-Pineda, 2001 WL 876784, at *5 
(10th Cir. Aug. 3, 2001). 
 
In sum, the Commission has not in any way indicated 
that its current definition of aberrant behavior is precisely 
what it meant to say (but neglected to) all along. We hold 
that S 5K2.20 was a substantive change to the Sentencing 
Guidelines and cannot be applied retroactively to Spinello.10 
 
III. 
 
Monaco Challenge Based on an "Extraordinary" 
Family Situation 
 
Spinello focuses, finally, on whether the District Court 
relied on an erroneous legal standard in denying his motion 
for a downward departure due to an "extraordinary 
situation" which he analogizes to that which warranted a 
departure in United States v. Monaco, 23 F.3d 793 (1994), 
where a father had unwittingly involved his son in a crime. 
"[W]e have jurisdiction to decide whether a sentencing court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Given this disposition, we need not reach the question of whether, 
had we decided the issue differently, the commentary and one or more 
of the various exclusions to S 5K2.20 would have precluded the 
application of the guideline to Spinello. 
 
                                18 
  
erred legally when not making a requested downward 
departure, but we cannot hear a challenge to the merits of 
a sentencing court's discretionary decision not to depart 
downward from the Guidelines." United States v. 
Georgiadis, 933 F.2d 1219, 1221 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
Spinello contends that the District Court ruled as a 
matter of law that it lacked the authority to grant a 
departure because of its belief that the basis for departure 
in Monaco was limited to the "special relationship that 
fathers have with their sons" where, here, Spinello was 
invoking his relationship with his brother, Michael, and the 
anguish he felt over having caused his brother to be 
indicted and tried for perjury.11 Spinello claims that we 
have jurisdiction to review his claim that the District 
Court's narrow reading of Monaco was erroneous. 
 
While the Court did, in fact, note that the absence of a 
father-son relationship was a ground for its ruling, it did 
not say that it was the only ground. Rather, the Court 
stated that it was "not convinced that even if what 
happened in Monaco [a conviction of a relative] happens 
here, that Mr. Robert Spinello might suffer the greater 
moral anguish and remorse than is typical." We consider 
the District Court's statement to be a finding on the merits 
that, wholly aside from its belief that the application of a 
Monaco departure was limited to father-son or even parent- 
child relationships, Spinello failed to show that his anguish 
and remorse rose to a level warranting relief. Accordingly, 
we lack jurisdiction to consider the District Court's 
discretionary decision to deny the motion for a downward 
departure. United States v. Nathan, 188 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 
1999). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Shortly after Robert Spinello was convicted, Michael Spinello was 
charged with perjury in connection with his testimony before the grand 
jury and at his brother's trial. The perjury charges related to Michael's 
contention that the $3,500 found in his living room table was the 
proceeds from a November 8, 1998 gambling excursion. Subsequent to 
Robert's sentencing, Michael was acquitted after Robert testified that, 
all 
unbeknownst to Michael, he had removed $3,500 from the table on the 
same day that he later robbed the bank and that his act of "replacing" 
the gambling money with the robbery loot caused Michael to actually 
believe that his testimony at Robert's trial was truthful. 
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IV. 
 
Conclusion 
 
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgment 
of conviction and sentence. 
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